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Executive summary  
Main subject of this paper is to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate cash flow from operating activities (CFO) through the use of real 
earnings management (REM), in situations with increasing leverage. Based upon a study of 
Jelinek (2007) who researched the correlation between increasing levels of leverage and 
accrual earnings management, I developed my main hypothesis with respect to the effect 
of leverage increases on REM to influence CFO. Results indicate that in leverage increasing 
firms, the leverage results in REM, in order to affect CFO, when using the absolute value of 
long term debt in calculating leverage.  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
1.1  Historical perspective and actuality 
The focus of external users on reported earnings as a central variable for making decisions 
and recent corporate scandals have caused earnings management (EM) to find itself in the 
center of public attention. Much quoted in this respect is Arthur Levitt, former Chairman 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). In his speech of 1998, Levitt (1998) 
talked about the “the numbers game” with which he attacked practices where 
management abuses  “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, 
“cookie jar” reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process research and development 
(R&D) (Healy and Wahlen 1999). These practices are threatening the credibility of financial 
reporting, according to Levitt. Others followed Levitt when they expressed their views 
about EM. Frits Bolkestein, the former Dutch European Commissioner in charge of Internal 
Market and Taxation for example, raised his concerns regarding EM in his speech of July 
2002. Bolkestein (2002) said: “We must have factual, not fictional, accounting.” He also 
emphasized the importance of company accounts that are true and fair and stated that 
companies: “… must not distort, hide, fabricate and present, in whole or in part, a 
misleading web of lies and deceit.” 
Managers who want to influence accounting income can choose from a large set of 
methods. Some of the methods require real transactions and some are pure accounting 
decisions. In general, EM is classified into the two categories: EM achieved by fraudulent 
activities and EM achieved by non-fraudulent activities.  EM while staying within the 
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boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), may be accomplished 
through accruals, manipulations with no cash flow effects and through real earnings 
management (REM), manipulations which do have cash flow effects. In this paper EM 
achieved by fraudulent activities and EM achieved by non-fraudulent activities are seen as 
two different categories. So with EM I will only refer to non-fraudulent activities that stay 
within the boundaries of GAAP.  
A significant portion of studies on EM have focused on EM through manipulation of 
accruals. However, Graham et al. (2005) find evidence that managers take real economic 
actions to maintain accounting appearances, and sometimes are more likely to use real 
actions than to use accruals to apply EM. It appears that managers are willing to burn 
“real” cash flows for the sake of reporting desired accounting numbers. There appears to 
be a constant tension between the short-term and long-term objectives of the firm.   
In the current global economy, it seems that a company can only survive by joining forces 
through mergers and acquisitions. Acquisition prices are often structured through capital 
increases and external debt financing which often results in increasing interest charges. 
Next to the focus on reported income statement earnings, analysts and investors focusing 
more on cash flows rather than the income statement of a company as a result of 
corporate scandals analysts have lost faith in earnings-based metrics. This is also caused by 
high interest charges more and more companies seem to face, as a result increasing 
financial loans and increasing interest rates. Sufficient cash flows from operating activities 
are essential for these companies to remain profitable and viable in the future. Lack of 
cash flows could result in bankruptcy or a Company to turn into a takeover prey. Knowing 
that investors  use the cash flow statement to make investment decisions,  highly 
motivated and intelligent management teams could be involved in REM  to create  ways to 
influence  the true picture of a company’s cash flow from operations (CFO) and receive or 
maintain external debt financing.   
Highly leveraged companies could favor cash flow from operations in favor of other 
financial support sources primarily because many analysts believe that cash flow from 
operations is a more transparent indicator of a company’s performance.  The results of the 
research performed by Nwaeze et al. (2005), suggest that leverage has positive and 
significant effect on the role of cash flow from operations.  
The importance of reliable information on CFO for investors and the (adverse) economic 
consequences that manipulations of real activities might have, makes  REM an interesting 
subject. In this paper for leverage increasing firms, the relationship between REM and 
leverage increases is researched to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate CFO through the use of real REM.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definition of REM 
and provides evidence from prior studies on the existence of REM. The third section 
consists of three parts. In the first part, I develop the main hypothesis, based on this 
extensive literature overview. The second part presents the design of a conceptual model 
to identify REM that affects CFO, the model to analyze solvability. The sample period and 
sample selection presented in the third part. The interpretations of results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5, provides the analysis of results and gives the suggestions for further 
research. Finally, the summary and conclusion are presented in section 6. 
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2. Real earnings management and prior literature 
 
Introduction 
Based on recent literature a definition for REM is given. Next, an overview of relevant 
literature in the field of REM is presented. Recent studies are categorized in groups and 
provide strong evidence on the existing of REM and show methods on how REM can be 
measured. 
 
2.1  Real earnings management 
For the purpose of the paper I define REM as a purposeful action by management of a 
company to alter reported earnings in a particular direction, which is achieved by changing 
the timing and/or structuring of an operation, investment and/or financial transaction 
with cash flow effects and has sub-optimal business consequences.  
This definition is based on definitions given by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Zang (2007). 
From the definition we learn that there should be managerial intent in order to influence 
earnings by structuring transactions. This is the key to the definition of REM.  The way a 
firm accounts for a transaction depends on the form of the transaction. Consequently, if a 
firm can design a transaction to give it a specific form, it will be able to record this 
transaction in a desired way; this is what Healy and Wahlen (1999) call “structuring 
transaction” (Stolowy and Breton 2004).  Also there is a difficulty in parsing out which 
effect is due to normal business activities and which is due to real management activities. 
In this paper the focus will be on manipulation through real activities. The reason for this 
is twofold. First the negative value implications of manipulating real activities are thought 
to be the one of the most serious forms of earnings management (Ewert and Wagenhofer 
2005; Chen et al. 2008). The second reason, is that by definition, accruals management 
does not directly affect cash flows, but merely changes the timing of revenue and expense 
recognition. However, REM can adversely affect cash flows both in the short in the long 
term by, for example by cutting discretionary expenditures. 
 
2.2 Prior studies 
The possibility that managers manipulate real activities is discussed in the academic 
literature. In general, most of the existing work focuses on R&D expenditures (Baber et al. 
1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Cheng 2004). 
Baber et al. (1991) found that relative R&D spending is significantly less when spending 
jeopardizes the ability to report positive or increasing income in the current period. In 
most instances, choices among accounting practices have no direct cash flow 
consequences, but changes in R&D spending to satisfy current-period income objectives do 
alter cash flow.  
Dechow and Sloan (1991) investigate the hypothesis that chief executive officers (CEOs) in 
their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-
term earnings performance. The authors examine the behaviour of R&D expenditures for a 
sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing R&D activities. The results 
suggest that CEOs spend less on R&D during their final years in office. 
Next to Dechow and Sloan, Bushee (1998) examines firms trying to meet previous year’s 
earnings and finds that they reduce R&D more if they have lower institutional ownership. 
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He found evidence that R&D reductions by firms trying to meet earnings thresholds are 
potentially value-destroying and are prevented by the presence of sophisticated investors. 
Also evidence exists on firms engaging in a whole range of activities in addition to just R&D 
expense reduction.  
Cheng (2004) provides evidence that compensation committees establish a greater positive 
association between changes in R&D spending and changes in CEOs options in order to 
prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D spending. He defines the horizon problem as the 
CEOs that are 63 or older, and myopia as a firm facing a small earnings decline or a small 
loss. 
There are few studies about how managers use specific transactions, other than cutting 
R&D expenditures, to influence earnings. Some of the studies focus on stock repurchases 
(Hribar et al. 2006; Bens et al. 2003), examine the sales of fixed assets (Herrmann et al. 
2003; Bartov 1993), sale price reductions (Jackson and Wilcox 2000), overproduction, 
managing of sales, advertising, SG&A expenses and effect of REM (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Gunny 2005) and trade off between accrual and REM (Zang 2007). 
 
I briefly review the remaining studies. 
 
Stock repurchases 
Hribar et al. (2006) extend Bens et al. (2003) in several ways. They identify the conditions 
under which a stock repurchase increase earnings per share (EPS) and document the 
frequency of accretive (i.e., EPS increasing) repurchases. Second, they examine whether 
accretive stock repurchases are disproportionately more frequent among firms whose 
reported quarterly EPS would have otherwise fallen short of analysts’ forecasts. The study 
provides evidence on whether stock repurchases are used to manage reported EPS.  Third, 
they investigate how investors price the repurchase-induced accretive component of 
reported EPS when the extent of repurchase in first disclosed. 
Bens, Nagar and Wong (2003) investigate the use of stock repurchases to offset earnings 
per share (EPS) dilution caused by employee stock options. They report that managers of 
firms increase the level of their firms’ stock repurchases in years when options-related EPS 
dilution increases and when annual earnings are below the level required to sustain past 
EPS growth rates. Managers partially finance these repurchasing by reducing R&D.  
 
Sales of fixed assets 
Herrmann et al. (2003) examine the usage of income from the sale of fixed assets and 
marketable securities to manage earnings. They found a negative relation between income 
from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income 
is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) 
earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. 
Bartov (1993) examines sales of fixed assets and shows that the profit from sales of assets 
is negatively correlated with earnings changes. He uses this to argue that firms facing 
earnings declines boost profits through increased asset sales.  
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Sale price reductions 
Jackson and Wilcox (2000) in their study, made an investigation whether managers grant 
sales price reductions in the fourth quarter to accelerate customer purchases and, as a 
result, avoid losses and declines in earnings and sales. Consistent with expectations, the 
results of univariate and multivariate tests indicate that firm managers grant sales price 
reductions in the fourth quarter to meet annual financial reporting targets. 
 
Overproduction, managing of sales, advertising, SG&A expenses and effect of real 
manipulation 
Management of sales, reduction of discretionary expenses, overproduction are examined 
by Roychowdhury (2006). In his study he develops the empirical methods to detect real 
activities manipulation other that reduction of R&D expenses. The results suggest that 
drawing inferences on earnings management by analyzing only accruals may be 
inappropriate, because suspect firm-years manipulate real activities to avoid reporting 
losses. Additionally, firms appear to be managing real activities to a greater extent if they 
have a higher proportion of current liabilities. 
Next to Roychowdhury, Gunny (2005) examines the extent to which REM affects 
subsequent operating performance (as measured by both earnings and cash flow) and 
whether investors anticipate the performance consequences of real management. The 
results provide evidence that REM has an economically significant impact on future 
performance. 
 
Trade off between accrual and real earnings management 
Zang (2007) studies whether managers use real manipulation and accrual manipulation as 
substitutes in managing earnings and studies the order in which managers make these 
decisions.  The author follows the prior literature on REM (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 
2005). She found that managers determine real manipulation before accrual manipulation. 
Based on this result, she used an empirical model that captures the sequentially of real 
and accrual manipulations to test the tradeoffs between the two. 
Cohen et al. (2007) document that following the passage of SOX accrual-based earnings 
management declined significantly, while REM increased significantly. Consistent with the 
results of a recent survey by Graham et al. (2005), this suggests that firms switched to 
managing earnings using real methods, possibly because these techniques, while more 
costly, are likely to be harder to detect.  
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2004) found factors that determine the intensity of the 
substitution of accounting by REM and the welfare effects, such as substitution rates 
between accounting and REM by manager, the real cost of earnings management, and the 
precision of the market knowledge about the manager’s incentives. 
The most important evidence on REM is provided by Graham et al. (2005). The authors 
found strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to maintain accounting 
appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report that they would decrease 
discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. 
More than the half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an 
earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value.  
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3.  Hypothesis development, research design and sample 
 
Introduction 
In this section, I present my hypotheses with respect to the effect of leverage increases on 
REM and more specific on REM to influence CFO. I also discuss REM in relation to CFO. Next 
the focus is on external financing and more specific on solvability or leverage. Then the 
definition of solvability and relevance for REM is given. Based upon these discussions, the 
hypotheses for this study are presented. 
 
3.1  Hypothesis development 
 
CFO 
The majority of investors are now keenly aware of the concept of quality of earnings. As a 
result, certain investors ignore reported earnings and use the operating activities section 
of cash flow statement as a “reality check” on reliability of the revenues and expenses 
reported in the income statement. The cash flow statement (CFS) is one of three 
statements required for financial statements to be in accordance with US GAAP. 
The definition of CFO is specified in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
No. 95, Cash Flows and is defined as follows: “Operating cash flows are those that are 
related to the corporation’s operating activities (i.e., those activities reflected in the 
corporation’s income statement).  
From the definition we learn that the CFO section reports the corporation’s ongoing cash-
generating activities that provide cash for dividend and other payments. 
Prior studies provide evidence the existence of REM (Section 2). The effects on CFO had 
significantly less focus of researchers.  Because REM is thought to be the one of the most 
serious forms of EM and is an issue that concerns the investment community, it is 
important to better understand the factors that could be behind this phenomenon.  
There are some studies that assume that cash flows are free from manipulation (Givoly and 
Hayn 2000; Barth, Cram and Nielson 2001). However, recent academic studies indicate that 
managers may engage in and benefit from managing cash flow (Melendrez et al. 2005; 
Graham et al.2005). 
There are indications that managers take real actions to report positive or to improve CFO 
(Zhang 2006). Taking into account the importance of reliable information about CFO for 
investors and the (adverse) economic consequences that manipulations of real activities 
might have (Gunny 2006) the question arises whether companies are, in a certain situation, 
for example, companies with relatively high or increasing debt, more likely to take real 
actions with positive cash flow consequences. 
 
Leverage 
In the current global economy, as already noted in section 1, it seems that a company can 
only survive by joining forces through mergers and acquisitions. Companies that have high 
leverage may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments on their 
external debt financing; they could also be unable to find new lenders in the future. So, if 
a company wishes to take out a new loan, lenders will scrutinize several measures of 
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whether the company is borrowing too much and will demand that it keeps its debt within 
reasonable boundaries.  
Previous literature suggests that leveraged firms engage in EM to avoid debt covenant 
default (Beatty and Weber 2003; Dichev and Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). 
However, these studies measure EM using accrual based measures. 
Jelinek (2007) studies the effect of leverage increase on accrual EM. Jelinek suggests that 
leverage changes and leverage levels have a different impact on EM and concludes that 
increased leverage is associated with reduced accrual EM. Moreover results suggest that 
there is a beneficial consequence of debt because the increased debt reduces manager’s 
discretionary spending, and in turn, reduces accrual EM.  
The conclusion has been drawn by Jelinek could be incorrect. As there could be another 
explanation of why increased leverage is associated with reduced accrual EM. For example 
companies with increasing debt could be involved in the REM. However, increased leverage 
could give an incentive for managers to switch from accrual earnings management to REM. 
Moreover, reducing of discretionary expenses is one of the REM activities that could 
provide evidence that the company engage in REM. 
One relevant research on management of CFO is performed by Zhang (2006) and comes 
close to consider the effect of the level of leverage on REM; he investigates the possibility 
that debt covenants, amongst others, could be a one of the incentives for management to 
manipulate cash flow through real activities. The result of his research suggests that 
coefficients on debt covenants are positive but not significant, because the proxy to 
capture incentives is too crude. Unlike this paper, Zhang considers the incentives to avoid 
default of debt covenants, amongst which debt-to-equity-ratio, rather than researching 
whether changes in the level of leverage are positively correlated to REM.  
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model to investigate whether increases of 
leverage of a company are an incentive for management to manipulate earnings through 
real activities in order to affect CFO. Based on the study of Jelinek (2007) that 
distinguishes between leverage increasing firms and highly leveraged firms the main 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Leverage results in real earnings manipulation by management.  
 
Based on study Jelinek (2007) and based on the primary purpose of this paper, I distinguish 
between high leverage and leverage-increasing firms. To investigate whether leverage 
changes and leverage levels have different impact on REM, I present the following 
hypothesis:   
 
H2: Real earnings management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with the level of leverage. 
 
Based upon my study of recent literature, I was unable to identify other previous research 
that focuses on researching these hypotheses. This is most likely caused by the focus of 
earnings management on accruals management, and less on REM. Researchers that focus 
on REM most commonly research the effects on earnings rather than effects on CFO. As 
such, and to my best knowledge, this is the first time a hypotheses is developed to identify 
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the positive correlation of the level of leverage and the changes in leverage with REM used 
to positively effect operating cash flows. In the next section I develop a model to test 
these hypotheses and identify data samples.  
 
3.2  Research design  
Models to measure real activities manipulation 
In general, in literature two models are indentified to measure real activities 
manipulation.  
 Investigating firm’s total level of REM. As a proxy for REM researchers (Chen et al. 
2007) use abnormal level of cash flows from operations. To determine normal level of 
CFO they use the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) which was implemented in 
research by Roychowdhury (2006).  
 Examine abnormal level of cash flows from operations and also abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal production costs, and the sum of standardized three REM 
proxies, to capture the effects of real actions presumably better (Roychowdhury 
2006).12  
Roychowdhury focuses on the following three manipulation methods:  manipulation of 
sales, overproduction, decrease of discretionary expenses . In general, some of three 
activities would increase operating cash flows, but some would decrease them. 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a model, that will more precisely measure 
whether the increasing level of solvability (leverage) of a company is an incentive for 
management to manipulate earnings through real activities  and not the existence of a 
higher or lower level of  REM. Therefore, I use abnormal CFO based on Roychowdhury 
[2006], as a proxy for REM. The reason is twofold. First, I am primarily interested in 
investigating a firm’s total level of REM in order to identify increasing effects of REM on 
cash flow from operating activities rather than a mixture of positive and negative effects 
of REM on cash flow from operating activities, and abnormal cash flow from operation is 
one such aggregate measure. Second, not one model is deemed to have prevalence above 
the other model. The explanation could be that studies concerning REM are only in 
development.  
 
Normal level of CFO 
To determine normal level of cash flow from operating activities for every firm and year, I 
use the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented in research by 
Roychowdhury (2006).  
Roychowdhury (2006) explains normal CFO as linear function of sales (Sit) and change in 
sales in the current period (ΔSit). All variables in the model are scaled by lagged total 
assets (Ai,t-1).  
 
(CFOit /TAi, t-1 =  α0t + α1t [1/TAit-1] + α2t [Sit/TAi, t-1] + α3t [∆Sit/TAi, t-1] + εit  (1) 
 
 
                                             
12 This proxy for REM has been used and verified to be valid in subsequent studies by Gunny (2006), Cohen 
(2007), Zhang (2006), Zang (2007). 
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Abnormal CFO 
Next, for every firm and year, I calculate abnormal level of cash flow from operation (RE). 
Abnormal CFO is equal to actual cash flow from operation minus the “normal” cash flow 
from operation computed using estimated coefficients from the above equation (1). 
 
Model to measure level of leverage 
In general, two widely used methods exist to measure the level of leverage. Measurement 
based on the use of book value debt and equity (i.e., accounting) or market value of debt 
and equity.  There is no law or regulation stating how the level of leverage should be 
measured. For example, in case of leased assets accountants try to estimate the present 
value of the lease commitments. In the case of long term debt they simply show the face 
value. This can sometimes be very different from present value.  To be consistent with 
previously studies (i.e., Nwaeze et al. 2005; Jelinek 2007), first I measure leverage 
(LEVERAGE) as the ratio of long term debt to the total of book value of equity and long 
term debt.  Although more commonly a ratio of long term debt to book value of equity is 
used, I use this method as it is preferable in situations where a sample includes companies 
with a negative book value of equity. A negative book value of equity would otherwise 
result in a low leverage level (negative) despite the absolute value of long term debt. 
Therefore the first formula to calculate LEVERAGE can be shown as follows:  
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt / book value of equity + long term debt.   (2) 
 
Furthermore, I also measure the level of leverage using market values as valuation models 
in the finance literature that use leverage ratios as inputs are generally based on the 
market value of debt and equity (White et al. 2003). Market values of both debt and equity 
are available or can readily be estimated, and their use can make the ratio a more useful 
analytical tool. The use of market values, however, may produce contradictory results. 
The debt of a firm whose credit rating declines may have a market value well below face 
amount. A debt ratio based on market values may show an “acceptable” level of leverage. 
A ratio that would control for this phenomenon and can be used in conjunction with book- 
or market-based debt ratios is one that compares debt measured at book value to equity 
measured at market: 
The formula for calculation this leverage ratio is as follows:  
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt at book value / market value of equity.   (3) 
 
In addition, I also use the actual book value of long term debt as a measure for solvability.  
The main reason for this is the assumption that a company with a high absolute amount of 
long term debt could be closely monitored by the issuers of debt irrespective of the 
relative value of long term debt in comparison to equity. Therefore, I want to measure 
whether the total amount of long-term debt is correlated to the level of REM. To 
determine the LEVERAGE based upon this measure, leverage is calculated as shown below: 
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt.         (4) 
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Model to measure hypotheses 
Since I have chosen to calculate leverage in three separate ways in order to determine 
whether one or more of these models individually affect the level of REM, the hypothesis 
H2 is subdivided into three sub-hypotheses. I estimate three distinct models by using 
ordinary least squares regression to separately test the three hypotheses. 
In order to reflect the first book value approach to calculating the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis: 
  
H2.A: Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(2) measured level of leverage.  
 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LEV_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (5) 
 
In order to reflect the market value approach to calculating the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis:  
 
H2.B: Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(3) measured level of leverage. 
 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LEV_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (6) 
 
In order to reflect the absolute value of long term debt as the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis:  
 
H2.C : Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(4) measured level of long term debt . 
 
The hypothesis H2.C represents that REM is positively correlated to leverage for leverage-
increasing firms, when using the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LTD_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (7) 
 
Control variables 
This study controls for size. Large firms are more widely followed by the analyst’s 
community and have a different information environment than smaller firms. To control 
for this I include variable (SIZE) in the regression. Also, I include variable (CAPIN) to 
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control for capital intensity. Zhang (2006) suggests that cash flow information is relatively 
more important for capital intensive firms than for non-capital intensive firms.  
 
3.3  Sample period and sample selection 
Similar to Roychowdhury (2006), I require that cash flow from operating activities is 
available on Compustat from the Statement of Cash Flows. This restricts my sample to the 
post-1986 period. As stated  previously, I strive to examine changes in REM across leverage 
increasing firms and highly leveraged firms. For identifying the sample period I use results 
of previous studies. The studies by Graham et al. (2005); Cohen et al. (2007) documented 
that the level of REM activities declines prior to The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and 
increased significantly after the passage of SOX.  As a result my sample is further 
restricted to the post-2002 period. The effects of SOX are expected to be presented earlier 
in financial information of US based companies compared to foreign private issuers (foreign 
companies listed on the US stock exchanges) who were not required to comply with SOX 
until 2005. As such, my study will collect data for U.S. firms in Compustat rather than non-
U.S. companies. To determine the sample and firm classification, I carry out a similar 
sample selection method as previously presented by Jelinek (2007) in her study. As a result 
the total number of companies in my data set equals to 1.287 firms (7.722 observations). 
Next, I divided my total sample of 1.287 firms into the following three potential samples: 
Samples 1 year 2002-2004, Sample 2 year 2003-2005 and Sample 3 year 2004-2006. Then, 
based on Jelinek (2007), I classified each firm in each of three samples as Leverage-
Increase firm or Constantly Highly-Leveraged.   
 
Figure 1. Determination of leverage-increasing firms and control firms  
Most Leveraged      4th Quartile      4th Quartile
      3th Quartile      3th Quartile
       2th Quartile      2th Quartile
Least Leveraged      1th Quartile      1th Quartile
 
 
A firm is classified as a Leverage-Increasing firms if: the firm is initially in the first 
(bottom) or second quartile of the sample leverage distribution at the beginning of a 
sample period and moves up at last 2 quartiles by end of the sample period. A firm is 
classified as a Constantly Highly-Leveraged if it is in the third quartile of the leverage 
distribution at both the beginning and the end of a sample period, or in the fourth quartile 
of the leverage distribution at both the beginning and the end of a sample period. I 
excluded all firms without classification from each of the three samples.  
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4.  Results 
 
Introduction 
This section presents the test of hypotheses, the results and interpretation of results.  
 
4.1  Test and Results 
 
Test 1 Hypothesis H2.A 
Consistent with hypothesis H2.A, leverage-increasing firms, where leverage is measured 
based on book value of equity, should have increased abnormal CFO at the end of a sample 
period.  
I run regressions (5) for each Box separately. Then, I also re-estimate the regression (5) for 
all three samples together. The results of this test are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: 
Leverage calculated based on book value of equity:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 75 348 423 H.2A positive 
not 
significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 86 413 499 H.2A positive 
not 
significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 84 453 537 H.2A negative significant 
Total   245 1214 1459 H.2A negative 
not 
significant 
 
The output shows that the coefficient of LEV_INC is positive, but not significant in two first 
regressions for sample-box 1 and box 2 (p-value equals .194 and .437). In the regression of 
sample-box 3 the coefficient is reported as a negative (-.114) and significant (p-value is 
0.006). This result indicates that increased leverage, relative to constantly high levels of 
leverage, is associated with negative REM, suggesting reduced operating cash flow 
manipulation. However, average prediction accuracy (Adjusted R-square) equals to 8%. 
Therefore the results of sample-box 3 require further investigation in future research using 
a larger sample and a longer post-SOX sample period. 
 
Test 2 Hypothesis H2.B 
Consistent with hypothesis H2.B, leverage-increasing firms, where leverage measured 
based on market value of equity, should have increased abnormal CFO at the end of a 
sample period. I run regressions (6) for each Box separately. Then, I also re-estimate the 
regression (6) for all three samples-boxes together. The results of this test are presented 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3: 
Leverage calculated based on market value of equity:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 70 252 322 H.2B negative 
not 
significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 76 304 380 H.2B positive Significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 86 348 434 H.2B positive 
not 
significant 
Total   232 904 1136 H.2B positive 
not 
significant 
The output produced by SPSS reports that only in Box 2 coefficient of LEV_INC positive 
(.194) and significant at 5% level (p-value 0.040), suggesting that leveraged–increasing 
companies in sample box 2 are more likely to manipulate cash flows. The coefficient on 
leverage in two other boxes is not significant. Average prediction accuracy (Adjusted R-
square) is equal to 7%. The re-estimating of the regression (6) for all three samples 
together does not present significant result on increased leverage. 
Test 3 Hypothesis H2.C 
Similar to the hypotheses H2.A and H2.B I test the hypothesis H2.C.The results of this test 
are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: 
The actual book value of Long Term Debt is used:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample 
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 8 107 115 H.2C positive significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 10 120 130 H.2C positive significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 9 124 133 H.2C positive significant 
Total   27 351 378 H.2C positive significant 
                  
 
The results show that the coefficient on long term debt (LTD_INC) is positive and 
significant at 1% level in all three boxes (Box 1: 0.117, Box 2: 0.142, Box 3: 0.095) which is 
consistent with H2.C. In other words the results of this test suggests, that firms with 
increased long term debt are more likely to manipulate CFO, which support H2.C 
hypothesis; management appears to be managing cash flows more in these firms than in 
other firms. Also by re-estimating of the regression (7) for all three samples together the 
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coefficient on long term debt is positive and significant at 1% level. The average adjusted 
R square is 30%.   
 
 
5.  Analysis of results and suggestions for further research 
 
5.1  Analysis 
In summery, I examine the impact of increased leverage on REM, paying particular 
attention to distinguish between highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms. The main 
hypothesis states that increased leverage results in real earnings manipulation by 
management in order to affect cash flow from operating activities.  
I estimate three distinct models by using ordinary least squares regression to separately 
test three sub-hypotheses. The sub-hypotheses are based on three different methods to 
measure level of leverage.  
The overall test results indicate that from three above mentioned hypotheses: H2.A, H2.B 
and H2.C only the last hypothesis supports the main hypothesis H1. This hypothesis states 
that the leverage results in real earnings manipulation by management in order to affect 
CFO firms, when using the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. The 
results of testing of the hypotheses H2.A and H2.B are ambiguous and as such no evidence 
has been found to support these hypotheses by my research. H2.C however does provide an 
unambiguous support to the main hypotheses. 
 Furthermore, it is worth noting the relation between real earnings measure proxy and two 
control variables SIZE and CAPIN. The coefficient on capital intensity (CAPIN) is significant 
at 1% level and positive across all regressions, consistent with Zhang (2006), finding that 
CFO is relatively more important for capital intensity firms. In contrast to Zhang (2006), 
the coefficient on SIZE is positive and significant across all regressions. The explanatory 
power of last model is quite high compared to other models. 
 
5.2  Suggestions for further research  
This study consists of some data limitations and different assumptions in the models.   
First, Jelinek (2007) distinguishes between firms with leverage increases and the firms with 
leverage that is consistently high at the both the beginning and the end of a six 
consecutive five-year sample periods (from 1992 to 2002). The main reason for this is to 
avoid capturing temporary changes in debt, which may not meaningfully impact managerial 
behaviour. As indicated in previously chapters, the level of REM activities declines prior to 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and increased significantly after the passage of SOX.  
As a result my sample is restricted to the post-2002 period and consists of only a five-year 
period (from 2002 to 2006) – I use three consecutive three-year sample periods with the 
assumption that the expected results are not affected. Therefore the recommendation for 
further investigation in the future research is to use a larger sample and a longer post-SOX 
sample period. 
Second, this study collects the data for U.S. firms in Compustat rather than non-U.S. 
companies. In future years I recommend that this study is also carried out for non-U.S. 
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges or more widely on listed stock exchanges in 
varies countries.  
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Third, I measure the level of leverage using market values as valuation models in the 
finance literature that use leverage ratios as inputs are generally based on the market 
value of debt and equity. A debt ratio based on market values may show an “acceptable” 
level of leverage.  I use the ratio that would control for this phenomenon and that 
compares debt measured at book value to equity measured at market. 
Also, other causes may play a role that have not yet been addressed. One of these causes 
is the method of measurement of abnormal cash flows from operating activities. Abnormal 
CFO is measured on the basis of the figures from the previous period (assets etc).  For 
example, if business activities are suddenly increased in the current year through 
acquisitions, increased CFO that would be justified by this increase, would be incorrectly 
marked as abnormal. Use of the pro forma financial information could control for this 
phenomena. 
  
 
6.  Summary and conclusion 
 
6.1  Summary 
As my main subject of this paper is to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate cash flow from operating activities through the use of real 
earnings management, in situations with increasing leverage, external financing in relation 
to earnings management was discussed. I found several studies that linked the level of 
external financing to the use of real earnings management. However, no studies were 
found that specifically linked increasing levels of external financing or leverage to the use 
of real earnings management. Based upon a study of Jelinek (2007) who researched the 
correlation between increasing levels of leverage and accrual earnings management, I 
developed my main hypothesis with respect to the effect of leverage increases on real 
earnings management and more specific on real earnings management to influence cash 
flows from operating activities. My results indicate that by the distinguishing between 
highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms, the leverage results in real earnings 
manipulation by management, in order to affect CFO, when using the absolute value of 
long term debt in calculating leverage.  
 
6.2  Conclusion 
This study is motivated by business press and recent researches that firms engage in 
manipulation of operating cash flows. The results make the following main contribution to 
existing literature. First, this study is the first that measures the impact of leverage levels 
and leverage changes based on Jelinek (2007) on abnormal CFO. My results indicate that by 
the distinguishing between highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms, the leverage 
results in real earnings manipulation by management, in order to affect CFO, when using 
the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. In other words the results 
suggest that firms with increased long term debt are more likely to manipulate cash flow 
from operation. Second, my result is significant in light of previous recent literature on 
leverage/REM where the researches do not find evidence of a significant association 
between leverage and real activities manipulation as incentive for managers to manage the 
operating cash flows. (Roychowdhury 2006, 35; Zhang 2006, 26). This is primarily because 
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previous research focused on constant leverage (high, low or scaled) and not on leverage 
increases. It is however important to keep in mind certain limitations in my research which 
are discussed in section 5. 
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